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This article investigates the effects of macroeconomic policy (monetary and fiscal) on output growth during 
financial crises characterized by a “sudden stop” in net capital inflows in developing and emerging market 
economies. We investigate 83 sudden stop crises in 77 countries over 1982-2003 using a baseline empirical 
model to control for the various determinants of output losses during sudden stop crises. Extending the 
baseline model to account for policies-- contractionary as well as expansionary-- we measure the marginal 
effects of policy on output losses. Simple descriptive statistics indicate no apparent correlation between the 
costs of financial crises and the economic policies pursed at the time. Once controlling for various pre-
conditions and other factors, however, we find that monetary and fiscal tightening at the time of a sudden 
stop crisis significantly worsens output losses.    
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1. Introduction 
The “sudden stop” of international capital inflows to developing and emerging market 
economies has become a major disruptive factor in several recent financial crises. The sudden-
stop problem features an abrupt cessation in foreign capital inflows and/or sharp capital outflows 
leading to a balance of payments crisis. A growing literature suggests that the collapse of 
investment and financial intermediation resulting from sudden stops is the main component of the 
very dramatic output collapses that have periodically hit many developing and emerging market 
economies. More than one hundred sudden stops in capital inflows may be identified over the 
past twenty-five years, with an average output loss by one measure approaching almost 10 
percent of GDP.
1   
Calvo et al. (2002), for example, provide a sudden-stop interpretation for the recent crisis 
in Argentina in which the capital flow reversal together with dramatic real exchange rate 
depreciation significantly worsened the government’s fiscal position, led to a debt default, and an 
output collapse. Hutchison and Noy (2006) show that sudden stops have severe consequences for 
the economy, as the abrupt reversal in foreign credit inflows in conjunction with a realignment of 
the exchange rate typically cause a sharp drop in domestic investment, domestic production and 
employment. In a broader historical examination, Bordo et al. (2001) argue that the sudden stop 
problem has become more severe since the abandonment of the gold standard in the early 1970s. 
The IMF financial assistance programs signed by Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia during 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis generated a very heated debate about the best use of fiscal and 
monetary policies during a crisis situation. The IMF policy recommendation, which were 
incorporated as an integral part of the conditionality agreements in their loan packages, called for 
fiscal and monetary tightening. This was articulated clearly by the IMF First Deputy Managing 
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Director at the time, Stanley Fischer. One of the most prominent critics of this prescription was 
Joseph Stiglitz, then Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. This public 
disagreement on such a key policy issue among the leading economists at the two major Bretton 
Woods institutions is unprecedented.  
Fischer argues that the prescription of tight fiscal and monetary policy is justified by the 
fact that the governments that entered a crisis usually face large budget deficits and high 
inflation. When describing Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, Fischer writes that: “The 
macroeconomic parts of these programs consist of a combination of tight money to restore 
confidence in the currency and a modest firming up of fiscal policy to offset in part the massive 
costs of financial restructuring.” (Fischer, 1998, p. 103). Providing further detail, he writes: “On 
the appropriate degree of fiscal tightening, the balance is a particularly fine one. At the onset of 
the crisis, countries needed to firm up their finances, both to cover the costs of financial 
restructuring, and—depending on the balance-of-payments situation—to reduce their current 
account deficits, which depend in part on the budget deficit.” (Fischer, 1998, p. 105). 
Stiglitz, by contrast, agrees that the key monetary component is restoring confidence but 
argues that confidence arises out of a good macroeconomic environment and not tight policies in 
the midst of a financial crisis. A healthy growth rate is the best indicator, in his view, to bolster 
confidence and a prescription of tight money and high interest rates will do exactly the opposite. 
He notes that “…maintaining tight monetary policies has led to interest rates that would make job 
creation impossible even in the best of circumstances” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 17). Thus, by making 
the recession even deeper, the policy ends up reducing confidence in the economy rather than 
enhancing it. Stiglitz terms this the ‘beggar-thyself’ policy (Stiglitz 1999a, 1999b). Regarding the 
Asian financial crisis, he writes: “…contractionary fiscal and monetary policies combined with 
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misguided financial policies led to massive economic downturns, cutting incomes, which reduced 
imports and led to huge trade surpluses, giving the countries the resources to pay back foreign 
creditors.” (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 107-8). 
To date there is no professional consensus, based on theory or empirical studies, on which 
approach is more conducive to achieving growth targets following a sudden stop in capital 
inflows. Aghion et al. (2004) and Lahiri and Végh (2007), for example, in theoretical papers, 
examine the impact of monetary policy on currency crises and conclude that contractionary 
monetary policy (an interest rate defense) might result in greater output contraction.
2 In contrast, 
Christiano et al. (2004) conclude from their theoretical work that when there are frictions in 
adjustment in the traded goods sector, an expansionary monetary policy during a financial crisis 
might be welfare reducing. Similarly, Céspedes et al. (2004) and Cúrdia (2007) look at exchange 
rate policy during currency crises and conclude that a flexible regime is Pareto superior.
3 Razin 
and Sadka (2004) offer an analysis of fiscal policy in a debt crisis and describe the conditions 
under which increasing the budget surplus might not help even if the original trigger for the crisis 
was government debt; while Mitra (2006) introduces an equivalent examination and concludes 
that the impact of fiscal policy on the growth outcome depends on the flexibility of production. 
Little empirical work has addressed the optimal policy response to a financial crisis. This 
paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature. In particular, we consider "sudden stop" financial 
crises and investigate the wide range of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy responses to 83 
crises that have been occurred over 1980-2003 in 66 countries. The paths of economies at the 
time of sudden stops vary widely (Table 1), with about 65 percent of sudden stop crises followed 
by an output contraction, and about 35 percent of the cases followed by an output expansion. In 
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the extremes, at least by one measure (defined below), output varies from cumulative output loss 
(relative to trend) of over 80 percent of GDP to a cumulative gain of over 20 percent of GDP.  
However, it is not clear what factors, and especially which government policies, have 
contributed to the wide diversity of outcomes. Some examples illustrate this point. During the 
1982 Latin American crisis, Bolivia sharply contracted both money and fiscal policy, while Chile 
held monetary policy steady and only instituted a mildly contractionary fiscal policy. Both 
countries, however, experienced sharp declines in output-- Bolivia on the order of 24% of GDP 
and Chile around 28% of GDP. In response to sudden stops, Malaysia pursued a fiscal expansion 
and no contraction in monetary policy (1997) while Venezuela pursued a monetary expansion 
and a steady fiscal policy (1994). Both countries, despite the differences in their policy responses, 
experienced significant output declines.   
Moreover, it is not even obvious from casual observation of the aggregate data how 
policies are linked to output losses during sudden stops. The top panel of Table 1 shows the 
number of observations (frequencies) associated with output contraction and expansion, in the 
columns, against observations of fiscal contraction and expansion in the rows. (Although we have 
83 cases of sudden stops in the sample, we only have fiscal data for 64 cases). About 2/3 of 
sudden stops are associated with output contractions. Of the 44 episodes of output contraction 
during sudden stops, 17 were associated with fiscal contraction and 27 with fiscal expansion. Of 
the 20 cases associated with output expansion, 8 cases were associated with fiscal contraction and 
12 cases with fiscal expansion. Similarly, no simple story is apparent from monetary policy 
responses, shown in Table 1. The great majority of cases of either output contraction or output 
expansion were not associated with a significant change in monetary policy (73 percent and 89 
percent, respectively). Monetary contractions were only followed in about 9 percent of sudden 
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stop episodes, and expansionary policy in about 13 percent of the cases. Only 5 episodes of the 
cases with output declined were associated with monetary contractions, and a similar percentage 
of monetary contractions were followed when output expanded during sudden stop episodes.  
The summary statistics reported in Table 1, and illustrative cases discussed above, suggest 
that a number of factors, working simultaneously, have influenced the evolution of output 
following sudden stop crises. Our objective is to investigate the effects of macroeconomic 
policies on the path of output following sudden stops while controlling for a host of variables that 
are also likely to play an important role. No study to date has explored this issue using a broad 
range of crisis experiences. Rather, the extant literature typically considers a series of case 
studies. These provide very valuable insights but it is difficult to derive general conclusions. In 
our work we focus on sudden stops, since these are the crises that have been most costly and the 
response to them the most controversial. The central issue we address is the optimal 
macroeconomic policy response to a sudden stop crisis. We consider the effectiveness of 
monetary and fiscal policy responses, as well as various combinations of policy responses, in 
mitigating the output losses usually associated with financial crises. We employ regression 
methods in our empirical investigations (cross section of sudden stop crisis episodes) to control 
for the wide variety of factors potentially affecting output paths of economies, and formally test 
several hypotheses on the effects of contractionary (expansionary) macroeconomic policy 
responses to financial crises. On balance, we find support for the view that contractionary 
monetary and fiscal policies during a financial crisis exacerbate the economic downturn.  
Section 2 reviews the literature on sudden stops and highlights our contribution. Section 3 
presents the basic empirical model. Section 4 discusses the data employed in the study, and 
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section 5 reports summary statistics on key macroeconomic variables and the primary empirical 
results of the study. Section 6 concludes.  
  
2. Why should a sudden top cause a collapse in output?  
Recent theoretical literature, following the pioneering work of Calvo (1998) and Calvo 
and Reinhart (2000), emphasizes the linkage between sudden stops and output losses. Calvo 
(1998, 2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2000) analyze several channels through which a sudden 
stop in international capital flows may bring about a currency and balance of payments crisis and, 
subsequently, an output collapse. One mechanism may be termed the traditional Keynesian effect 
whereby a fall in credit, attributable to the sudden stop in capital inflows, combined with an 
external financing premium and a “financial accelerator,” reduces aggregate demand and causes a 
fall in output (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999). Furthermore, firm bankruptcies may cause negative 
externalities-- banks may become more cautious and reduce loans. This in turn may induce a 
further fall in credit—the “vanishing credit effect” described in Calvo (2000)--and exacerbate an 
output decline.   
Another mechanism, termed the Fisherian debt-deflation channel by Mendoza (2001), 
emphasizes that a sudden stop, given collateral constraints, might induce margin calls, a sell-off 
of assets and consequently a contraction of credit and output (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, 
2001, and Mendoza and Smith, 2006).
4 In these frameworks, even though the government sector 
is typically not modeled, it is likely that a Keynesian prescription of expanding demand through 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies would reduce the severity of a sudden stop crisis. A 
third possible channel focuses on the contract enforceability/moral hazard problem as described 
in Schneider and Tornell (2004) and the search friction model of Gopinath (2004). Moreover, 
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Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002 and 2004), Durdu and Mendoza (2006), and others develop 
models that suggest changes in the global financial architecture might lead to the prevention of 
sudden stops or to lowering their costs.  
Until recently, however, most empirical literature has not clearly distinguished between 
the different types of financial crises. Kaminsky (2006) sets out a crisis classification scheme and 
demonstrates that sudden stops are a special variety of financial crises. She argues that a sudden 
stop, in the sense of a capital inflow reversal in tandem with a currency/balance of payments 
crisis, is a special type of currency crisis. Using a regression-tree classification methodology, she 
finds that the set of explanatory factors associated with sudden stop special crises are different 
than other financial crises. Honig (2005), Calvo et al. (2004 and 2006), Cavallo and Frankel 
(2005) and others also empirically examine the factors explaining the occurrence of sudden stops. 
Several recent papers empirically analyze output developments around the time of banking or 
currency crises in broad samples of countries, e.g. Aziz et al. (2000), Barro (2001), Bordo et al. 
(2001), Gupta et al. (2007), Hutchison and McGill (1999), Hutchison and Noy (2002, 2005) and 
Frankel (2005).  
The empirical finding that the causes of sudden stops differ from currency, banking and 
“twin” (joint currency and banking) crises suggest that the effects on the real economy are also 
likely to be different. Indeed, Hutchison and Noy (2006), in a large panel of countries over time, 
find that the costs of sudden stops are much higher than those for other types of financial crisis. 
Becker and Mauro (2006) also identify episodes of output collapse (‘output drops’) and 
empirically associate those with the occurrence of sudden stops. Bordo et al. (2001), Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (2000) and Edwards (2004) focus on the determinants of the costs of crises, 
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emphasizing the effect of structural factors such as trade openness, the size of the preceding 
current account deficit and the exchange rate regime.  
However, no paper that we are aware has attempted to empirically measure the impact on 
output of the ex-post policy macroeconomic policy decisions taken in response to a sudden stop.   
 
3. Estimating the effects of policies on the output costs of sudden stops 
The first step in the analysis is to set out a benchmark model that attempts to explain 
output costs following a sudden stop financial crisis by a standard set of variables. Our 
observational units are a cross-section of sudden stop episodes (98 in total) and the question we 
address is, given the occurrence of a sudden stop, what variables and policies appear to influence 
its severity in terms of output losses. The benchmark output cost model introduce relevant control 
variables into the regression equation, allowing us to identify the marginal effects of 
macroeconomic policy and limit potential omitted-variables bias. The controls are from a broad 
set of variables identified in the literature as important determinants of the output cost of 
financial crises (see appendix).  
In the context of our benchmark model, we test for the additional effect of fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies on output growth following a sudden stop (we discuss the 
definitions of the policy variables in section 4).  
The formal specification of the empirical model is as follows: 
12 3 k
fis mon exr Cost D D α ββ β β Δ =+ + + + + ii i ii X ε i                        (1) 
Where Cost is the cost of the sudden stop i in terms of forgone output (deviations from trend 
output growth), X is a vector of control variables, 
fis Δ is the change in discretionary fiscal policy, 
and  D
x  are binary indicators of policy x (1=expansionary/contractionary, 0=not 
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expansionary/contractionary) for monetary expansion, monetary contraction, domestic exchange 
rate support operations (international reserve de-cumulation), and foreign exchange rate support 
operations (international reserve accumulation). We construct our fiscal and monetary policy 
variables so as to limit the likelihood that reverse causality (from output losses to policy changes) 
will bias our estimates. In particular, we measure only the discretionary part of fiscal policy 
(derived from country-specific measures of fiscal stance over time) and construct binary 
indicators for discrete changes in monetary policy stance. This is described in the next section.  
The cross-sectional methodology we employ is also less susceptible to some of the simultaneity 
issues more pervasive in dynamic panel and time series analyses.  
  
4. Data description 
We focus on developing and emerging market countries since they are the subject of 
policy discussions and recent financial crises and output collapses. Several studies indicate that 
developing and emerging market countries are different from industrialized/developed countries 
with respect to the factors that make them susceptible to a financial crisis (Broner and Rigobon, 
2006; Glick and Hutchison, 2005; Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2002; and Tornell and 
Westermann 2002). Specifically, these countries tend to be especially open to international 
capital inflows that are short-term in nature and usually denominated in foreign-currency 
(“original sin”) in the terminology of Eichengreen and Hausman, 2005). These characteristics 
increase the vulnerability of developing and emerging-market economies to swings in exchange 
rates and cessation of new capital to roll over expiring debt.  
 
Defining the output cost measures 
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There is no single commonly accepted methodology to measure the output costs of a 
crisis or, for that matter, the foregone output costs associated with a more generic economic 
recession. For this reason we use three alternative measures of output cost in our empirical 
analysis to test the robustness of our results.  
Our benchmark measure is based on a methodology developed by researchers at the 
International Monetary Fund. The benchmark output loss measure (OC1) is constructed by 
comparing, in real terms, the pre-crisis GDP growth rate of a given country with the GDP growth 
rate during the subsequent years until the return to the pre-crisis rate of growth. The pre-crisis 
GDP growth is calculated as the average of GDP growth rates from year t-3 to t-1, where year t is 
the start of the crisis. (Windows are imposed such that only sudden stop episodes preceded by 
“tranquil periods”, i.e. pre-crisis periods without a sudden stop, are included in the sample.) Each 
GDP growth rate from year t onwards is then compared to the trend until the trend growth is 
reached. The output loss is defined as the sum of the difference between the actual and the trend 
growth rate over all the years until the trend growth is reached again.
5  
Our second output cost measure (OC2) measures the end of the crisis as three years after 
the original capital flow reversal. The output cost is then constructed as the difference between 
the real GDP growth rate in the sudden stop episode (years t to t+2) and the pre-crisis GDP 
growth rate (years t-3 to t-1). Our third measure (OC3) assumes that the crisis continues for two 
years and the output cost is constructed as the difference between the average real GDP growth 
rate in years t and t+1 and the pre-crisis GDP growth rate (years t-3 to t-1). 
 
Defining Sudden Stops  
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Calvo et al. (2004) and Cavallo and Frankel (2005) define sudden stops as any country-
year in which three conditions are met: (1) there is a significant reversal of capital inflows (a 
decrease in the financial account of at least 2 standard deviations below the country-specific 
sample mean), (2) any reduction in the current account deficit in either year t or in t+1, and (3) a 
fall in per capita GDP (of any amount). Hutchison and Noy (2006) define a sudden-stop crisis as 
one in which there is the contemporaneous occurrence of a currency crisis and a current account 
reversal (a change in the current account of more than 3% of GDP) while Jeanne and Rancier 
(2006) use a somewhat similar definition identifying a sudden stop episode as one in which there 
is a change in the capital account of more than 5% of GDP).  
The latter two alternatives use more arbitrary thresholds, and so, in our study, we follow 
Honig (2005) in using the first two conditions in the Calvo et al. (2004) algorithm, but excluding 
the third condition - the output contraction requirement.
6 Thus, a sudden stop crisis is defined as 
a year in which the financial account decreases by at least 2 standard deviations, while the current 
account surplus increases (at years t or t+1 and by any amount). 
 
Defining fiscal policy measures 
We are interested in the discretionary fiscal policy response to a sudden-stop crisis, and 
not in the automatic fiscal stabilizers to a decline in output. For this reason, we need to 
decompose the fiscal accounts into their structural and cyclical components. The empirical 
literature on alternative measures of fiscal policy stance is large and somewhat controversial (see 
Blanchard, 1990). We employ a standard measure that attempts to measure discretionary fiscal 
policy by extracting both trend and cyclical measures from the budget balance, allowing us in 
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turn to derive changes in the discretionary fiscal stance. Specifically, discretionary fiscal policy is 
measured as the estimated residual for each country over time from the following equation : 
12 0 1 t t tt yy BB t
1 β βμ αα − =+ + ++          ( 2 )  
Where  t BB  is budget balance (percent of GDP) of a particular country in the sample, y is the real 
GDP growth rate for the country, "t" is the time trend, and μ is the random error term. The change 
in discretionary fiscal policy for country i is defined as  
1 ˆˆ
fis
it t μ μ − Δ= −         ( 3 )  
where 
t μ ˆ is the estimated error term from equation (2). This measure of the change in fiscal 
stance is constructed to be independent of output movements and avoids simultaneity bias in our 
estimates of equation (1).  
In the cases that the parameter estimates are not statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level, we apply the following decision rules. For countries with less than 5 
observations for BB data, we run the regression with just a constant, i.e. no trend or cyclical 
component. For countries with more than 5 but less than 10 observations, we run the regression 
with constant and time trend term. For countries with more than 10 observations, we initially run 
the regression with a constant, time trend and a cyclical component, and then drop the cyclical 
variable if it is insignificant while keeping the constant and time trend.  
 
Defining monetary policy measures 
Monetary tightening episodes are considered as country/years in which the change in the 
monthly discount rate exceeds two country-specific standard deviations above the country-
specific mean. This follows the practice in the empirical literature that examines the effects of 
monetary policy on the exchange rate following a financial crisis (e.g. Baig and Goldfajn, 2001, 
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and Goldfajn and Gupta, 2003). The discount rate is our indicator for monetary policy primarily 
because it is the only interest rate measure widely available for developing and emerging market 
countries. Another desirable feature of the discount rate is that it is under the control of the 
authorities, moves infrequently, and signals discrete policy shifts. We assign the years with one 
or more monetary tightening months the value of 1 and 0 otherwise (i.e., 1= tightening, 0= not 
tightening). Monetary expansion episodes are considered as country/years in which the change in 
the monthly discount rate is smaller by at least two country-specific standard deviations from the 
country-specific mean. We assign the years with one or more monetary tightening months the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise (i.e., 1= loosening, 0= not loosening). 
For some country years, there is ambiguity in assigning the tightening and loosening 
dummies. This is because there are years during which both monetary tightening and loosening 
occurred in different months. In these cases, we look at the quarterly current account and 
financial account data to determine at which quarter the sudden stop occurred (the quarter in 
which current account deficit drops and financial account surplus declines). We assign the 
particular year as a monetary tightening (loosening) episode if discount rate during the sudden-





Defining exchange rate policy measures 
We measure exchange rate policy as indicated by international reserve changes. 
Accumulating international reserves is interpreted as foreign currency support operations, and de-
cumulating reserves as domestic currency support operations. The reserve accumulation episodes 
are defined as country/years in which the change in the monthly non-gold reserves exceeds two 
country-specific standard deviations above the country-specific mean change. We assign the 
 
  15 
years with one or more reserve accumulation months the value of 1 and 0 otherwise (i.e., 1= 
reserve accumulation, 0= otherwise). Similarly, reserve de-cumulating episodes are defined as 
country/years in which the change in the monthly non-gold reserves is smaller than two country-
specific standard deviations below the country-specific mean change. We assign the years with 
one or more reserve de-cumulating months the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. 
For some country years, we have doubts in assigning the reserve accumulation and de-
cumulation dummies when episodes of reserve accumulation and de-cumulation occurred in the 
same year. In these cases, we look at the quarterly current account and financial account data (for 
doubt year only) to determine at which quarter the sudden stop occurred. Then we assign that 
year is a reserve accumulation (de-cumulation) year if the non-gold reserves during the sudden 
stop quarter accumulated (de-cumulated).
9 In the cases that the quarterly data is not available, we 
compare the first 3-month non-gold reserves with the last 3-month non-gold reserves. We assign 
that year is a reserve accumulation (de-cumulation) year if the non-gold reserves during the 




The list of control variables we use in the multivariate regressions is guided by previous 
research (summarized in section 2) and our concerned over omitted-variables bias. We include 
variables in the regressions that the extant empirical literature has shown to have influenced the 
magnitude of the output cost associated with sudden stops. This is important since we want 
control for factors, other than monetary/fiscal/exchange rate policies that are likely to influence 
the output path of a sudden-stop episode. We use the following variables:  (1) liability (deposit) 
dollarization per nominal GDP; (2) An index of the degree of openness of the capital account; (3) 
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trade openness (the sum of exports and imports as percent of GDP); (4) a binary indicator of 
banking crises; (5) inflation (the average of 3 pre-crisis years’ inflation to proxy for general 
macroeconomic stability); and (6) an index of the de facto exchange rate regime.
11 The exact 
definitions and sources for these variables are provided in the data appendix.   
 
5. Empirical Results  
Descriptive statistics on sudden stops, fiscal, monetary and exchange Policies 
  Table 2 reports the frequencies of sudden stop events. The number of sudden stops 
jumped markedly between the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, and climbed further in the first 
few years of this decade (2000-2003). Among the developing and emerging market countries, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, Latin America experienced episodes of sudden stops in capital inflows 
most often. 
  Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the output measures and the control variables 
(policy measures are shown in Table 1). We note that the three output measures yield different 
measures but their correlation is very high (0.68-0.84). The average cumulative output loss 
ranges from around 1.4% to 9.2%, depending on the measure employed, with large standard 
deviations that reflect a substantial range of experience. For the control variables, table 3 
provides summary statistics, across the cross-section of sudden-stop episodes, for liability 
dollarization (DLD), the de-facto exchange rate regime (DEFCTO), the degree of openness of the 
capital account (KAOPEN), a trade openness index (TRADE), the inflation rate (INFL), and the 
percentage of sudden stop crises accompanied by major banking crises (MAJ.)  
Table 3 shows that the average pre-crisis inflation rate for countries experiencing sudden 
stops was 26% (INFL), and 19% of these episodes were accompanied by major banking crises 
 
  17 
(MAJ). In addition, the average amount of foreign-currency liabilities (DLD, as a percent of 
GDP) at the time of sudden-stop episodes was 13%, but ranged from 0% to 222%. Average trade 
openness (TRADE) was over 80% of GDP (sum of imports and exports) at the point of the 
sudden stop, while capital market openness was appreciably lower—averaging -0.25 on an index 
ranging over the sample from -1.84 to 2.52 (high values indicate greater capital account 
openness). In terms of exchange rate regimes at the time of sudden stops (DEFCTO), countries 
on average has a high degree of rigidity (measuring 3.7 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, with high 
values indicating rigidity approximately fixed rate regimes). 
 
Benchmark model estimates  
Table 4 presents estimates of equation (1) using the benchmark measure of output costs 
(OC1). A negative value indicates a loss of output (cost), so that a positive (negative) coefficient 
on an explanatory variable implies that the variable decreases (increases) the cost of a crisis. In 
this set of specifications, our sudden stop crises sample is constructed based on the Honig (2005) 
criteria which allows (at most) 83 crisis observations. In the set of regressions described in table 
4, only the policy indicators are included as explanatory variables. 
 In equation 4.1 we include only the monetary policy variables and in equations 4.2 and 
4.3, respectively, only include the fiscal and exchange policy variables. In column 4.1, we find 
evidence that monetary tightening sharply increases the cost of a sudden stops (by 10 percentage 
points), significant at the 10% level, while the impact of a monetary expansion is not 
significantly different from zero (though the coefficient is positive). In equation 4.2, the 
coefficient estimate indicates that contractionary fiscal policy also sharply increases output costs, 
and the coefficient is also statistically significant at the 10% level. However, we find no 
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statistically observable effect for exchange policy (reserve accumulation/decumulation) in 
equation 4.3. Both fiscal and monetary variables are included in equation 4.4. This specification 
again indicates a strong link between monetary and fiscal contractions and the output costs of 
sudden stops. This finding is once again confirmed in equation 4.5 where all three policy 
measures (monetary, fiscal and international reserves) are included. 
Table 5 includes the policy variables with the control variables discussed in the previous 
section. Equation 5.1 includes only the control variables-- de-facto exchange rate regime, liability 
dollarization, capital account openness measure, trade openness, banking crises and inflation. The 
only significant determinant of output cost during sudden stops appears to be the joint occurrence 
of a major banking crisis. A banking crisis reduces cumulative output growth following a sudden 
stop by a full 12 percentage points.  
In equation 5.2, we include the fiscal and monetary policy measures. Fiscal contractions 
again have a clear negative effect on output costs and are statistically significant. Monetary 
contractions are also negative, but the statistical significance is reduced somewhat when the 
control variables are included. This is also true when we add the exchange policy measures in 
equations 5.3-5.4. 
Table 6 includes only the contractionary-policy measures (since expansionary-policy 
measures were not significant) and the set of control variables, adding as well an interactive term 
between capital account openness and trade openness. The results presented in Table 6 are 
consistent with earlier findings and equation 6.3 is especially noteworthy—all of the 
contractionary policy variables demonstrate statistically significant and economically important 
adverse effects on the economy in assessing the output cost of a sudden stop. In particular, the 
results indicate that an increase of the discount rate (of more than two standard deviations) will 
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increase the output losses following a sudden stop by at least 10 percentage points. We also find a 
more modest and less robust adverse impact of fiscal tightening; and a bigger (7 percentage 
points) adverse effect of a move to support the exchange rate by selling off international reserves. 
 
Robustness tests 
In order to evaluate the robustness of our results, we estimated the basic specifications 
shown in Tables 4-6 using our alternative measures for output cost (OC2 and OC3). The results 
reported above carry over to these series of regressions as well, perhaps not surprisingly given the 
high correlation between our three output cost measures. We do not report the results of these 
robustness tests for brevity.  
As an additional robustness check, we re-define the fiscal policy measures as a pair of 
binary variables that denote expansionary/non-expansionary and contractionary/non-
contractionary fiscal stances. These binary variables are constructed from the discretionary policy 
measure described in the data section and are equivalent to the monetary policy measures 




6. Conclusions  
  This article investigates the effects of macroeconomic policy (monetary and fiscal) on 
output growth during financial crises characterized by a “sudden stop” in net capital inflows in 
developing and emerging market economies. We investigate 83 sudden stop crises in 77 countries 
over 1982-2003 using a baseline empirical model to control for the various determinants of 
output losses during sudden stop crises. Extending the baseline model to account for policies-- 
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contractionary as well as expansionary-- we measure the marginal effects of policy on output 
losses.  
Simple descriptive statistics indicate no apparent correlation between the costs of 
financial crises and the economic policies pursed at the time. Once controlling for various pre-
conditions and other factors, however, we find that monetary and fiscal tightening at the time of a 
sudden stop crisis significantly worsens output losses.  In particular, the main finding of this 
paper is that contractionary monetary and fiscal policies in the midst of a sudden-stop financial 
crisis exacerbate the recessionary consequences associated with these episodes, and these adverse 
effects are economically large. Defending the exchange rate policy by selling off international 
reserves, by contrast, has little discernable effect on the output consequences of sudden stops. 
Contractionary macroeconomic policies during financial crises may have some value in terms of 
stabilizing balance of payments, and perhaps even catalyzing capital flows, but also raise output 
costs. This basic result is robust to different measures of output costs, different samples and after 
controlling for a host of variables that may influence the path of output during a sudden-stop 
financial crisis.   
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Table 1  Frequencies of Policy Choices and Output Outcomes in  
Developing and Emerging Markets 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                       Output contracted             Output expanded         





Fiscal contraction                          17                                       8                               25 
Fiscal expansion                            27                                      12                              39 




Monetary contraction                    5                                        2                                 7 
Monetary expansion                     10                                       1                                11 
No monetary change                     40                                      25                               65 




Reserve accumulation                 14                                        4                                 18 
Reserve de-cumulation                 9                                         1                                10 
No reserve change                       32                                       23                                55   
Total                                            55                                        28                                83 
Note: See text (section 3) for algorithms used to identify fiscal, monetary and reserve policies pursued and for 
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Table 2  Sudden Stop Event Frequencies in  
Developing and Emerging Markets Economies 
 




(% of sample) 
Decades 
1980-1989 19  1.29% 
1990-1999 52  3.54% 
2000-2003 31  5.27% 
Regions 
Asia 18  3.00% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  19  2.47% 
Latin America  24  4.55% 
Transition Economies  7  1.62% 
Rest of World  34  2.83% 
This table reports the frequencies of sudden stop events across 
time and space. In identifying the sudden stops, we use the 
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Table 3   Descriptive Statistics for Policy Variables and Macro-Controls: 
Developing and Emerging Market Economies  
 
Variable N  Mean  S.D.  MIN  MAX 
Output Loss Measures 
Output cost 1 (OC1)  83  -9.15  18.68  -81.28  22.38 
Output cost 2 (OC2)  83  -1.36  6.48  -17.51  22.38 
Output cost 3 (OC3)  83  -1.71  5.70  -21.07  16.76 
Correlation of…  OC2 to OC3: 0.84  OC2 to OC1: 0.68  OC3 to OC1: 0.77 
Control Variables 
DLD  84 0.13 0.29  0 2.22 
DEFCTO  75 3.68 1.30  1  5 
KAOPEN  49 -0.25  1.41 -1.84  2.52 
TRADE  82 83.88 44.69 21.74  216.21 
MAJ  83 0.19 0.40  0  1 
INFL  83 26.11 82.30 -8.62  693.98 
See text for algorithms used to identify the output cost measures using GDP data from the World Bank’s 
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Table 4   Policy-only Regressions 
 
Variable (4.1)  (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) 










TIGHTENING  -10.43180* 




LOOSENING  2.93287   
0.40     2.77888 
   0.31 
4.07268 
0.45 
DELTAD   -0.14589*   




RESERVED     -5.99293 
-0.93    -8.48140 
-1.03 
RESERVEA     -2.67514 
-0.52    -0.77084 
-0.13 
Observations  82  64 83 64 64 
R2  0.0413  0.0505 0.0121 0.1116 0.1277 
Adjusted-R2  0.0170  0.0351  -0.0126 0.0671 0.0525 
F-test  1.70  3.30 0.49 2.51 1.70 
Note: The table reports the change in output loss from sudden stops (dependent variable is OC1) in response to 
a 1 unit change in the variables with associated t- statistics in parentheses below. ***, **, * indicate the 
significant level at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively.  
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      -0.74   
-6.70754   





   -11.62694   
 -1.59   
-9.28456 













 -1.41003**     
-2.33   
-1.89597*** 





   -16.64839*     




















6.88238   







0.02875   





















Observations  67  54 54 63 
R2  0.1653  0.2796 0.3303 0.2581 
Adjusted-R2  0.0968  0.1516 0.1746 0.1482 
F-test  2.42  2.18 2.12 2.35 
Note: The table reports the change in output loss from sudden stops (dependent variable is 
OC1) in response to a 1 unit change in the variables with associated t- statistics in parentheses 
below. ***, **, * indicate the significant level at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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-7.8704***   
 -2.99   
-6.00057   
 -0.73   
-12.37911**   
 -2.45   
TIGHTENING 
-11.72160   
 -1.65   
-10.48243   
 -1.47   
-14.34684**   
 -2.60   
DELTAD 
-0.16385**   
 -2.08   
-1.84710***   
-2.86   
-1.91266***   
 -3.69   
RESERVED 
-7.87254   
 -1.00   
-15.21699   
 -1.65   
-21.56279**   
-2.70 
TRADE 
 0.04281     
0.70   
0.07381   
1.59 
MAJ 
 -3.69035     
 -0.50   
-6.51561   
 -1.18 
INFLATION 






   -0.03012 
-1.57 
Observations 64  54  46 
R2 0.1246  0.3159  0.5452 
Adjusted-R2 0.0808  0.1943  0.4614 
F-test 2.85  2.60  6.51 
Note: The table reports the change in output loss from sudden stops 
(dependent variable is OC1) in response to a 1 unit change in the variables 
with associated t- statistics in parentheses below. ***, **, * indicate the 
significant level at 1, 5, and 10 percent respectively. 
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Appendix A  Data Sources and Definitions 
Output Cost 1 definition (OC1): 
 
OC1 is constructed by comparing, in real terms, the pre-crisis GDP growth rate of a certain 
country with the GDP growth rate during the following years until the pre-crisis rate is reached. 
This approach considers pre-crisis GDP growth rates to be the trend or a country's potential 
growth rates. The pre-crisis GDP growth is calculated as the average of GDP growth rates from 
year t-3 to t-1, where year t is the start of the crisis. Then, each GDP growth rate from year t 
onwards is compared to the trend until the trend growth is reached. The output loss is defined as 
the sum of the difference between the actual and the trend growth rate over all the years until the 
trend growth is reached again. 
 
Variables used to construct the dependent and macroeconomic policy variables: 
 
• Annual real GDP growth           WDI, NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG 
• Monthly non-gold reserves, US dollar        IFS, Line 1l.d 
• Monthly discount rate, % per year, end of period     IFS, Line 60 




• Foreign liabilities (% of GDP)     DLD    IFS, Line 26c 
•  Trade openness:  TRADE  WDI, NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS  
Exports and Imports (% of GDP)       WDI, NE.IMP.GNFS.ZS 
• Inflation  rate        INFL   WDI, FP.CPI.TOTL.ZG 
• Banking  crises       MAJ   Hutchison  &  Noy,  2005 
• Capital account liberalization index    KAOPEN  Chinn & Ito, 2005 
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Appendix B    Sudden Stop episodes in non-OECD countries  
(Honig definition) 
 
Albania   1990  1995  Indonesia   1997     
Algeria   1990      Iran, I.R. of  1999     
Angola   2000     Israel    1988  1998 
Antigua and Barbuda   1998     Jamaica    2002     
Argentina   2001     Jordan    1992     
Barbados   1982  2002  Macedonia, FYR  1999     
Bolivia   1982     Malaysia    1994  1997 
Botswana   1993     Malta    1995  2000 
Brazil   2002     Mauritius    2001     
Cameroon   1988     Moldova    1995     
Cape Verde   1990  2000  Mongolia   1990     
Chile   1982  1998  Morocco   1995     
China,P.R.: Mainland  1998     Nicaragua    1986     
Colombia   1998     Oman    1987  1999 
Comoros   1988     Pakistan    1998     
Costa Rica   1996  2000  Panama   2000     
Cyprus 1998     Peru    1983  1998 
Dominica   1996  2001  Philippines   1997     
Dominican Republic   2002     Poland    1994  2001 
Ecuador   1983  1999  Solomon Islands   1998     
Egypt   1990      South Africa   2000     
El Salvador   1999      St. Vincent & Grens.  1999  2002 
Fiji   1999     Swaziland    1999     
Gabon   1989      Syrian Arab Republic   1989     
Gambia, The  1982     Thailand    1997     
Ghana   2000     Tonga    1985  1989 
Grenada   1999      Trinidad and Tob.  1984     
Guinea   1989     Tunisia    2000     
Guyana   1995     Ukraine    1998     
Haiti   1999  2002  Uruguay   2002     
Honduras   2000     Vanuatu    1991     
Hungary   1996     Venezuela  1994     
India   1995     Zimbabwe    1983  1994 
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Footnotes 
                                                           
1 See table 3 for details on this measure of output cost. See also Hutchison and Noy (2006) for another 
measure of the output cost of sudden stops (of 13-15% of GDP). 
2 In previous work, Lahiri and Végh (2003) examined the impact of an interest rate defense on crisis 
timing. 
3 Cúrdia (2007), in a theoretical paper, also examines the impact of various monetary policy rules on the 
consequences of sudden stops. 
4 In stark contrast, Chari et al. (2005) argue, based on a general equilibrium model, that sudden stops are 
expansionary and the reduction of output observed in recent crises is due to other financial frictions that 
overwhelm the positive effect of sudden stops. 
5 If the crises for a country are very close (less than 3 years apart), we ignore the second crisis and only 
include the first crisis in our sample to calculate output loss. For Cavallo’s (2004) Sudden stop episodes, 
Cameroon 1990, Chile 1983, Colombia 1999, Jordan 1993, Mexico 1995, and Mongolia 1991 are dropped 
out of our sample. If the crises for a country are 3 years apart, we use the pre-first-crisis trend as the trend 
growth for the second crisis in calculating output loss. 
6 Since we are attempting to explain the wide range of output paths following sudden stops, dropping the 
output contraction condition appears justifies. 
7 For the developing countries’ cases, the only case in which the classification was not straightforward was 
Turkey (1994). 
8 Using a binary measure goes some way toward accounting for a possible endogeneity of the monetary 
policy decision. We suspect that while the magnitude of the monetary reaction might depend on output 
developments, that is most likely not the case for the direction of that policy. 
9 Those country/years are: Israel (1988), Mexico (1995), Thailand (1997), Turkey (1994), and Venezuela 
(1994). 
10 Those country/years are: Algeria (1990), Barbados (1982), Chile (1983), Costa Rica (1981), and Egypt 
(1990). 
11 We obtained an initial list of control variables based on earlier literature, in particular the specifications 
in Calvo et al. (2004). We narrow this list of controls based on the benchmark regression statistics. In a 
previous version of the paper we also used total debt service (% of exports) and a government stability 
index. The inclusion of these variables does not change any of our main results.  
12 All the results reported in the last three paragraphs are available from the corresponding author upon 
request. 
 
 